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Abstract
Protecting image manipulation detectors against perfect knowledge
attacks requires the adoption of detector architectures which are intrin-
sically difficult to attack. In this paper, we do so, by exploiting a re-
cently proposed multiple-classifier architecture combining the improved
security of 1-Class (1C) classification and the good performance ensured
by conventional 2-Class (2C) classification in the absence of attacks. The
architecture, also known as 1.5-Class (1.5C) classifier, consists of one 2C
classifier and two 1C classifiers run in parallel followed by a final 1C clas-
sifier. In our system, the first three classifiers are implemented by means
of Support Vector Machines (SVM) fed with SPAM features. The out-
puts of such classifiers are then processed by a final 1C SVM in charge
of making the final decision. Particular care is taken to design a proper
strategy to train the SVMs the 1.5C classifier relies on. This is a crucial
task, due to the difficulty of training the two 1C classifiers at the front
end of the system. We assessed the performance of the proposed solution
with regard to three manipulation detection tasks, namely image resiz-
ing, contrast enhancement and median filtering. As a result the security
improvement allowed by the 1.5C architecture with respect to a conven-
tional 2C solution is confirmed, with a performance loss in the absence of
attacks that remains at a negligible level.
1 Introduction
The development of secure image forensics tools, capable of granting good per-
formance even in the presence of an adversary aiming at impeding a correct
∗The 1.5C code is avaliable on: http://github.com/EhsanNowroozi/ Accessed: 2019-09-05.
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1 INTRODUCTION
analysis is receiving increasing attention, due to the ease with which Counter-
Forensics (CF) tools erasing the weak traces the image forensic analysis relies
on can be designed [15]. This is even more the case with image forensics tech-
niques based on Machine Learning (ML). In such a case, in fact, the adversary
can exploit the weakness of machine learning tools against intentional attacks
as discussed in [18] and shown in [4] for the particular case of ML-based image
forensic tools.
The kind of techniques the adversary can use to launch his attacks, and
consequently the countermeasures the forensic analyst can rely on to combat
them, depends heavily on the information that the adversary has about the
to-be-attacked system [4]. By following [8], we say that we are in a Perfect
Knowledge (PK) scenario, when the adversary has a complete information about
the forensic algorithm under attack. In the case of techniques based on ML,
this includes the exact knowledge of the ML model resulting from the training
process.
In the PK case, very powerful CF attacks can be launched, which are capa-
ble of preventing a correct analysis while introducing a limited distortion into
the attacked image. Designing effective anti-CF solutions in a PK setting is a
difficult task, since in this scenario it is the attacker who plays the last move.
The PK assumption, in fact, implies that the attacker is aware of any possible
countermeasure adopted by the forensic analyst. The only solution in this case
is to rely on image forensics techniques which are intrinsically more difficult to
attack.
In this paper, we focus on image manipulation detection, a situation in which
the forensic analysis aims at deciding whether a given image has been subject
to a certain manipulation or not. In this case, the image forensic analysis boils
down to a binary decision, according to which the image space is partitioned into
two regions, corresponding, respectively, to pristine and manipulated images.
The most classical approach to face with this problem in a ML setting, is to train
the manipulation detector by presenting to it a number of images belonging to
the two classes. The goal of the training process is to partition the image space
in such a way that the training examples are classified correctly. The decision
rule adopted by the detector must be designed in such a way to maintain good
performance also when the detector is faced with new images that were not
contained in the training set (that is the detector must have good generalization
capabilities).
A problem with the approach described above is that the detector is forced
to make a decision for one of the two classes of images even when it is faced
with images whose characteristics are far away from those of the images seen
during training, possibly because such images do not genuinely belong to any
of the two classes. Suppose, for instance, that a classifier has been trained to
distinguish between pristine images directly acquired by a photocamera with no
further processing and median filtered images [37]. As long as the images fed
to the classifier belong to one of the above classes, the classifier will provide a
correct answer, based on the examples it has seen during training. However, if
we ask the classifier to make a decision on an image with completely different
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characteristics, e.g. a line drawing, a cartoon, or a bilevel image, what would the
classifier do? Very likely it would make a kind of random decision according to
the way the partition of the image space optimised on the images of the training
set is extended to regions of the image space for which no training example was
provided. In normal working conditions this may not be a problem, since one
can assume that the classifier will never be asked to work in such abnormal con-
ditions. In an adversarial setting, however, the presence of unpopulated regions
of the image space can be exploited by the attacker to induce a classification
error at a low price (image distortion). The above situation is depicted in Fig.
3(a), where a point of the red class is moved into an unpopulated part of the
blue-decision region with a minimum effort.
When the goal of the adversary is a unidirectional one, that is, when the
adversary aims at attacking only images belonging to one of the two classes, it
is possible to cope with the problem outlined above by resorting to a 1-Class
(1C) classifier [32]. In this case, the ML model is trained with images belonging
to one class only, so to teach it to recognise if an image belongs to such a class
or not. In this scenario, all other kinds of images will be classified as extraneous
ones. The main difference between a conventional 2-Class (2C) classifier and
a 1-class one, is that, in the latter case, the image space is partitioned into a
closed region, containing the images belonging to the class used during training,
and a complementary region with all the other images. As shown in Fig. 3(b),
an attacker aiming at moving an image in the outside (red) region into the
closed region characterising the images of the target class (blue region) can no
more exploit the presence of unpopulated regions of the image space since such
regions are - by default - assigned to the outer space.
Despite its attractiveness from a security point of view, the use of 1C clas-
sification has its own drawbacks, deriving from the fact that 1C classifiers do
not exploit any knowledge about the images belonging to one of the two classes.
By considering again the example of pristine and median filtered images, a 1C
classifier could be trained by considering only pristine images, however, in this
way it would not exploit any information about the particular traces left within
an image by a median filter. As a result, the performance of 1C classifiers in
the absence of attacks are expected to be lower than those obtainable by means
of a 2C architecture.
In order to couple the superior accuracy achievable by 2C classifiers and
the intrinsic security of 1C classifiers, Biggio et al. [7] has proposed a multi-
ple classifier architecture which combines the advantages of both approaches.
The proposed classifier, called one-and-a-half Class (1.5C) classifier, is therein
applied to spam and malware detection.
In this paper, we propose a 1.5C architecture for image manipulation detec-
tion and assess its effectiveness in the presence of ad-hoc CF attacks in a PK
scenario. More specifically, we consider three different kinds of manipulations:
image resizing, median filtering, and contrast enhancement, and show how the
1.5C classifier can be designed in such a way to achieve good performance in
the absence of attacks (comparable to those achieved by a standard 2-C clas-
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sifier) while at the same time being more difficult to attack in a PK scenario,
thus achieving a better security with respect to the 2C case. Particular care is
paid to the training process, since training the 1.5C classifier turns out to be
a difficult task due to the difficulty of training the 1C classifiers it consists of.
The security improvement allowed by the 1.5C architecture with respect to a
conventional 2C solution is confirmed experimentally, with a performance loss
in the absence of attacks that remains at a negligible level.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe previ-
ous attempts to improve the security of image forensics analysis by resorting to
1C classification. Then, in Section 3, we introduce the proposed 1.5C classifier
for image manipulation detection and describe the strategy we followed to train
it. In Section 4, we describe the methodology we used to evaluate the effective-
ness of the proposed system, while in Section 5, we present the corresponding
experimental results. The paper ends in Section 6 where we summarise the main
results of our research and suggest some directions for future works.
2 Prior art
The use of 1C classifiers is not novel in multimedia forensics and security-related
applications. In [14], the authors resort to 1C classification for video forgery
detection, in the attempt to devise a tool which works under challenging con-
ditions, like those encountered in social networks. In particular, the authors
resort to the use of an architecture based on autoencoders trained on pristine
data. When used in this way, autoencoders behave as 1C classifiers, with a
large reconstruction error between the input and output being interpreted as
an anomaly, i.e. a forgery. More in general, one class modelling is popular
for anomaly detection in many different applications, where a good statistical
characterisation under abnormal condition is not available. As an example, we
mention the problem of acoustic novelty detection [22] or the problem of de-
tection of abnormal events in video sequences [16]. A method for adversarial
anomaly detection, which exploits the combination of multiple 1C classifiers to
increase the hardness of evasion attacks against intrusion detection systems is
provided in [26].
1C classification has often been proposed as an alternative solution to con-
ventional multi-class algorithms, that classify a sample based on a number of
pre-defined categories, when an exhaustive list of such categories does not exist
[19]. This problem is often referred to as classification in open set conditions.
Open set problems have been studied in several image forensic and security-
oriented applications, such as fingerprint spoof detection [28] source device at-
tribution [12], and camera model identification [35, 5]. In [35], in particular, a
combination of one-class and multi-class SVMs is used to simultaneously recog-
nize the camera model among the models in a known set and, at the same time,
identify outliers, acquired by unknown camera models.
More recently, 1C classifiers have been used in conjunction with generative
adversarial models (GANs) to design detectors with work under the assumption
4
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Figure 1: General manipulation detection task considered in this paper (a) and
its adversarial version (b).
that no or very few instances of malicious samples are available for training. This
is the case in [36], where the problem of forgery detection of satellite imagery is
addressed, and in [38], with regard to general fraud detection, e.g. in reputation
systems.
3 Proposed System
In this section, we first formalise the detection problem addressed in this paper,
then we describe the 1.5C architecture originally proposed in [7] for pattern
recognition applications, the choice of the feature set, and the methodology
that we followed to train the 1.5C classifier.
The basic detection task addressed in this paper is schematised in Fig. 1(a).
Hypothesis H0 corresponds to the case of pristine images produced by an
acquisition device without any subsequent processing. H1 corresponds to the
case of processed or manipulated images. Fig. 1(b) depicts the case in which
the same detection task is carried out in an adversarial setting, in the presence
of an attacker aiming at impeding a correct detection. Specifically, we assume
that the goal of the attacker is to avoid that the manipulation is detected, that
is, the attacker’s goal is to induce a missed detection error. This kind of attack,
usually referred to as an integrity violation attack [18], is the most common
one in counter-forensics. In the sequel, we denote with Pmd the probability of
a missed detection error, namely the probability that a manipulated image is
detected as a pristine image (also indicated as P (H0|H1)), and with Pfa the
5
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Figure 2: Architecture of the one-and-a-half class (1.5C) classifier adopted in
this paper. I is the input image, while x is the feature vector extracted from I.
false alarm probability, that is the probability that a pristine image is detected
as being manipulated (namely, P (H1|H0)).
3.1 Architecture of the One-and-a-half-class (1.5C) Clas-
sifier
The architecture of the one-and-a-half-class classifier adopted in this paper is
depicted in Fig. 2. Given an image I, a feature vector x(I), or simply x, is
extracted and used to feed a multiple classifier whose first stage consists of the
parallel application of three classifiers: a 2C classifier, trained with examples
belonging to both classes (in our case, pristine and manipulated images) and
two 1C classifiers, one trained with images belonging to the H0 class (pristine
images) and the other trained with images from the H1 class (manipulated im-
ages). The outputs of these classifiers represent the input of a final 1C classifier,
referred to as combination classifier. Since the goal of our work is to increase
the security in the presence of integrity violation attacks, the final classifier is
trained with pristine data.
We denote with d1(x), d2(x) and d3(x) the output respectively of the 2C,
1C trained on pristine images and 1C trained on manipulated images classifiers;
f(x) denotes the decision function of the downstream 1C combination classifier
trained with pristine images. For ease of reference, in the sequel we indicate the
above classifiers with the acronyms 2CH0/1 , 1CH0 , 1CH1 and 1C
cmb
H0
, as indicated
in Fig. 2.
As discussed in the introduction, 2C classifiers are often capable of achieving
high accuracy in the absence of attacks, however they do not generalize well to
6
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examples that were not properly represented in the training phase, thus easing
the task of the adversary, that can exploit the presence of unexplored regions
of the features space to carry out his attack. Such a situation is exemplified in
part (a) of Fig. 3, where the attacker exploits the presence of empty regions
to induce a missed detection error (for simplicity, the figure refers to a case of
perfect classification in the absence of attacks). As a result, the 2C classifier
may be easily attacked as shown for instance in [1, 23] in the case of image
manipulation and forgery detection. On the other hand, by defining a closed
region enclosing the samples from one class only - usually the H0 class, 1C
classifiers are intrinsically more robust against attacks, even if they may get
worse performance in the absence of attacks. This behavior is illustrated in
Fig. 3 (b), where we see that moving a sample from the H1 to the H0 region
requires a larger distortion, due to the closeness of the acceptance region for
H0. Such an advantage comes at the price of a reduced accuracy in the absence
of attacks, since the one class classifier is not able to properly shape the closed
acceptance region given that it is trained only on examples generated under
H0 (the samples for which a missed detection error occurs are highlighted by a
circle in the figure).
The goal of the 1.5C classifier is to simultaneously retain the advantages of
2C and 1C classification, as illustrated in Fig. 3 (c). In particular, the 1.5C
classifier is expected to have a similar robustness against attacks as the 1C
classifier (moving a sample from H1 to H0 requires a similar distortion), while
the acceptance region is better shaped with respect to the 1C classification case,
then the performance in the absence of attacks are improved compared to the 1C
classifier, and are more similar to those obtained by the 2C classifier (the same
perfect classification is achieved in the illustrative example in the figure). This
behaviour is confirmed in our experiments for all the manipulation detection
tasks we have considered (see the results in Section ?? and ??).
3.2 Implementation of 1.5C Detector and Choice of the
Feature Set
The 1.5C architecture outlined in the previous section is a general one, and, in
principle, can be implemented by resorting to any kind of 1C and 2C classi-
fiers. In this work, we decided to implement all the classifiers the 1.5C classifier
consists of by means of Support Vector Machines (SVMs). The main reason is
the ease with which SVMs can be used to implement 1C classification. It goes
without saying that the use of alternative architectures can be explored as a
future research direction.
With regard to the choice of the feature set, we tried to balance between two
opposite requirements. On one hand, the features have to be powerful enough to
capture the different types of dependencies among neighbouring pixels in pristine
and manipulated images. On the other hand, we want to keep the dimensional-
ity of the feature set limited, so to make it possible to design the intermediate
and combination classifiers as SVMs, without resorting to more complicated
architectures such as ensemble classifiers [20]. Specifically, we selected the Sub-
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(a) 2-C (b) 1-C (c) 1.5C
Figure 3: Pictorial representation of the decision regions for 2C, 1C and 1.5C
classifiers. Blue dots refer to H0 hypothesis, red triangles to H1. The goal
of the attacker is to take samples belonging to H1 detection region and move
them inside the region for which the detector decides in favour of H0. The
performance of the 1.5C classifier are in line with those of the 2C, while it is
expected to be more robust under attacks, since a larger distortion, exemplified
in the picture by a longer arrow, is needed to move a sample from the H1 to the
H0 decision region. The presence of red triangles within the H0 decision region
in part b) illustrates the lower performance of the 1C classifier in the absence
of attacks.
stractive Pixel Adjancency Model (SPAM) feature set [27], originally proposed
for steganalysis and extensively used in image forensic applications [34, 21]. The
SPAM features are extracted as follows: first, the first-order residuals in all the
directions (horizontal, vertical, diagonal) and orientations (left to right and right
to left, up to down and down to up) are computed {←,→, ↑, ↓,↖,↘,↙,↗};
for instance, for the horizontal left to right direction we have D→i,j = Ii,j−Ii,j+1.
Then, the residual values are truncated at T (by default, T = 3); finally, the
second-order co-occurrences of the truncated residuals are computed. The num-
ber of features is reduced by exploiting the symmetries so that the dimension of
the final feature vector is equal to 686. We refer to [27] for the details of the fea-
ture computation procedure. SPAM features are designed for grayscale images;
when working with color images, they can be extracted from the luminance
channel.
3.3 Training the 1.5C Classifier
In this section, we describe the strategy we have adopted to train the interme-
diate and the combination classifiers. In general, training the 1.5C classifier is
not easy, especially when the detection task is not straightforward, as it is often
the case in image forensic applications. The difficulties are mainly associated
to the one-class classifiers which are difficult to train and may not achieve good
classification performance in many cases. The four classifiers of the 1.5C system
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are all SVMs whose hyper-parameters are determined by means of a preliminary
internal validation phase. Let (xi, yi) be the training pair for image i, where
xi ∈ Rr denotes the feature vector of dimensionality r and yi denotes the class
label associated to the image.
For a general intermediate SVM (hereafter indicated by the index j ∈
{2CH0/1 , 1CH0 , 1CH1}), the decision function dj(x) learned by the classifier is
expressed as:
dj(x) =
n∑
i=1
yiαj,iKj(xi, x) + bj (1)
where n is the number of training images, Kj(xi, x) is the kernel function of the
SVM, bj is the bias term, and αj is a vector of scalars with 0 ≤ αj,i ≤ Cj where
Cj is the cost term, that is, the penalty parameter of the error term (over the
training set) of the SVM optimization problem [9]. In our case, xi is the SPAM
feature vector of the i-th image; then, r = 686 and xi ∈ R686. For the 2CH0/1
SVM, we set yi = 1 for the images from the manipulated class and yi = 0 for the
pristine ones. For the 1C SVMs (1CH0 , 1CH1 ,and 1C
cmb
H0
) instead, the training is
unlabeled, that is, the SVMs are trained with (xi) only, and the decision function
is given by (1) with yi = 1, ∀i [29]. In this work, we adopt an RBF (Radial
Basis Function) kernel for the SVMs, that is, Kj(xi, x) = exp(−γj‖xi − x‖2),
where γj determines the width of the Gaussian kernel.
In a similar way, the decision function of the final combination classifier
(1CcmbH0 ) is expressed by,
f(x) =
n∑
i=1
αf,iKf (d(xi),d(x)) + bf (2)
where d(x) = (d1(x), d2(x), d3(x)) is the vector of the soft outputs of the inter-
mediate classifiers (d(x) ∈ R3) when the input feature vector is x, 0 ≤ αf,i ≤ Cf
and Cf is the cost term. The kernel Kf is again an RBF with parameter γf .
The best parameters γ∗j and C
∗
j (and γ
∗
f and C
∗
f ) of the classifiers, often re-
ferred to as hyper-parameters or internal parameters, are determined during
the validation phase.
Some observations are in order. In a 2C SVM, the parameter C rules the
tradeoff between the margin of the separating hyperplane in the higher dimen-
sional space (the transformation of the input x to the higher-dimensional space
defines the kernel [9]) and the misclassification of the training points. A large C
means that getting all the training points classified correctly, and then a smaller
margin, is preferable, even if this goes with the risk of data overfitting. For 1C
SVMs, according to the formulation by Scho¨lkopf et al. [30], the selection of the
hyper-parameters is conventionally carried out by considering γ and ν = 1/C
(rather than γ and C), where ν determines the margin of the decision region in
the higher-dimensional space. More specifically, the parameter ν sets an upper
bound on the fraction of errors, i.e., training samples being misclassified [29] (for
instance, by setting ν = 0.05, at most 5% of the training samples are allowed
to be wrongly classified).
9
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The most important parameter for both 2C and 1C SVMs in the case of
RBF kernel is γ, which determines the width of the kernel and then determines
how far the influence of a training sample reaches. Specifically, γ defines the
inverse of the radius of influence: the smaller is γ, the fewer support vectors
are selected and the decision region becomes more spherical. Essentially, γ
regulates the tradeoff between capturing the complex shape of the data (large
γ) and avoiding overfitting (small γ). If γ is too large, the radius of the area of
influence of the support vectors includes almost only the support vector itself
and no choice of the regularization terms C and ν is able to prevent overfitting.
3.3.1 Choice of the hyper-parameters of the intermediate classifiers
We optimized the hyper-parameters of 2CH0/1 on the validation set by means of
an exhaustive search. To do so, we first split the validation set into a training
and test set. Then we trained the system for every choice of the parameters
(C, γ), then we chose the pair with the best test accuracy, that is the pair
that minimizes Pe = 0.5Pfa + 0.5Pmd. For better performance in terms of
generalization capability, standard v-fold cross validation was also performed
for every C and γ [24], that is, we repeated the process v times each time by
splitting the set in a different way. The pair (C, γ) with the best average cross-
validation accuracy was then selected and used for training the system on the
training set.
Similarly, for 1CH0 and 1CH1 , we carried out an exhaustive search over both
γ and ν to find the pair leading to the best accuracy. However, the 1C classifiers
tend by construction to have poor performance with respect to the alternative
class, i.e., the class of samples not used for training. Since we wish to avoid
missed detection events (H1 detected as H0), in order to increase the security
against integrity violation attacks, we validated the 1C SVMs by weighting
differently the two kinds of error probabilities. Let α and β be the weights
assigned to the probability of a false alarm and a missed detection, respectively.
While for 2CH0/1 we let α = β, for the 1C classifiers we set α < β so that
the classifiers are trained in such a way to minimize the error probability term
αPfa +βPmd. This corresponds to consider a relatively small closed acceptance
region for 1CH0 and 1C
cmb
H0
, and a relatively large closed region for 1CH1 . The
situation is illustrated in Fig. 4. According to the adversarial setup considered
in our work (see scheme of Fig. 1(b)), in fact, the attacker aims at entering the
pristine region, or equivalently, exiting the manipulated region; then, choosing α
lower than β should improve the performance of the 1C classifiers in the presence
of attacks. Obviously, a considerable unbalance between the two weights may
imply worse performance in the absence of attacks. However, we verified that,
thanks to the presence of 2CH0/1 , the overall robustness of the 1.5C classifier
remains good even when α is much lower than β and then the 1C SVMs are
designed by focusing more on the security performance, at the possible cost of
a lower robustness.
10
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H0 
Pristine
H1 
Manipulated
(a) 2CH0/1 : α = β
H1 
Manipulated
H0 
Pristine
(b) 1CH0 : α < β
H0
Pristine
H1
Manipulated
(c) 1CH1 : α < β
H1 
Manipulated
H0 
Pristine
(d) 1CcmbH0 : α < β
Figure 4: Pictorial representation of the decision regions of the classifiers com-
posing the overall 1.5C detector. To get an advantage in terms of security, the
1C classifiers are designed by letting α < β. As a consequence, the 1C classifiers
trained on pristine images - (b) and (d)- will have smaller acceptance regions,
whereas the 1C trained on manipulated images - (c) - will have quite a large
acceptance region.
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4 Evaluation Methodology
The goal of the 1.5C detector is to combine the good performance of a 2C
classifier in the absence of intentional attacks (robustness) and the improved
security achieved by 1C classification (security). To prove that this is indeed the
case, we will show that the 1.5C detector is more robust than the intermediate
1C classifiers and that attacking the 1.5C detector requires a larger distortion
with respect to attacking the intermediate 2C classifier. In the next subsections,
we describe the exact methodology we have followed for our tests, while the
results we have got are presented and discussed in Section 5.
4.1 Goal of the Detectors
To asses the effectiveness of the 1.5C architecture, we focused on the detec-
tion of three different kinds of image manipulations, namely geometric trans-
formation, filtering and contrast enhancement. Specifically, we considered the
following three processing operations: resizing, median filtering and histogram
equalization. With regard to resizing, we considered a bicubic interpolation
and a resizing scaling factor (zooming factor) equal to 1.3. For median fil-
tering, we set the window size to 3 × 3, so to keep the visual degradation of
the filtered image limited. Finally, for histogram equalization, we considered
the Clip-Limited Adaptive Histogram Equalization (CL-AHE) algorithm [39].
With respect to standard Adaptive Histogram Equalization (AHE), CL-AHE
does not over-amplify noise in relatively homogeneous regions as done by AHE,
by clipping the histogram before computing the enhancement transformation.
In our experiments, the clip-limit parameter was set to 0.05. When working
with color images, the CL-AHE operator is applied to the luminance channel,
precisely to the V channel (then, the image is converted from the RGB to the
HSV color space). This is a commonly adopted strategy, since the straightfor-
ward application of CL-AHE to each color channel separately would unnaturally
change the color balance and produce a visually unpleasant image. The same
strategy is followed for the case of median filtering, which, once again, is applied
to the luminance channel only (the V channel in our case). An example of a
pristine image and the corresponding processed images is given in Fig. 5.
4.2 Datasets Creation
To produce the datasets for our experiments, we considered camera-native (un-
compressed) images. The images of the dataset were used to training, validate
and test the three intermediate classifiers (2CH0/1 , 1CH0 ,and 1CH1). The set
of images used for testing is further split to build the training and test set for
the final combination classifier 1CcmbH0 . More specifically, let us denote with SV
the set of images used for the internal validation of the hyper-parameters of
the intermediate classifiers, with STr the set used for training, and with ST
the set used for testing, see Fig. 6. The test set ST is further split into three
sets, namely SvT , S
tr
T and S
t
T , used, respectively, for internal validation, training
12
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(a) Pristine image (b) Histogram equalized image (CL-AHE)
(c) Median filtered image
(d) Resized image
Figure 5: A visual comparison between a pristine image (H0) and its manipu-
lated versions (H1), for the processing operators considered in this paper. The
clip-limit parameter for the CL-AHE is 0.05; the windows size for the median
filter is 3× 3; resizing is applied with a zooming factor equal to 1.3.
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Figure 6: Datasets used for training and testing the classifiers of the 1.5C sys-
tem. {SvT ∪ StrT ∪ StT } ≡ ST .
and testing of 1CcmbH0 . Since the dimensionality of the input feature vector of
the downstream 1C is very low, corresponding to the three soft outputs of the
intermediate classifiers (d ∈ R3), the number of images in SvT , StrT and StT (and
hence in ST ) does not need to be very large.
Starting from the above sets of images, no processing is applied to build the
samples of the first class (H0 - pristine images), see Fig. 1(a). For the second
class (H1), the samples are built by applying different processing operators, as
detailed in Section 4.1.
4.3 Robustness Analysis
The robustness of the 1.5C detector is assessed by adopting the setup illus-
trated in Fig. 1(a). Therefore, the system is trained and tested under the same
conditions, i.e., by assuming that there is no attack at test time.
The performance of the 1.5C system are measured over the test set StT , i.e.,
the set used for testing the final 1C classifiers. The metric used is the Area
Under Curve (AUC) of the ROC curve of the classifier. By comparing these
results with those achieved by 2CH0/1 (which is tested on the entire ST set - see
Fig. 6), we can compare the performance of the 1.5C architecture with respect
to a conventional 2C classifier, and assess the - possible - drop of performance
experienced in the former case.1 In general, 1C classifiers are known to have
poor robustness in presence of post-processing, limiting their applicability in
practice. To show that this is not the case with the overall 1.5C architecture,
we also run some experiments to assess the robustness performance of the 1.5C
classifier in the presence of noise addition and JPEG post-processing. Results
confirm that, thanks to the presence of the intermediate 2C classifier, the 1.5C
system performs much better than the intermediate 1C detectors in terms of
robustness. For sake of simplicity, for these tests, we only considered the case
of resizing detection. The exact results of our experiments will be detailed in
Section 5.
1We verified experimentally that the fact that the performance of 2C and 1.5C are not
tested exactly on the same set does not affect the results.
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4.4 Security Assessment
The security of the 1.5C classifier is assessed by evaluating the performance of
the system under attacks (see Fig. 1(b)). These performance are compared
against those achieved by 2CH0/1 , when tested under the same attack. The
goal of this analysis is to validate the expectation that the 1.5C architecture
offers a security advantage over 2C classification, in that attacking the system
introduces a larger distortion into the attacked images.
To be more specific, we considered the following attack model:
Attacker’s Goal: the attacker wants to modify a manipulated (H1) image
in order to induce a missed detection event, i.e., in such a way to move the
feature vector of the image into the region of pristine images (H0 region).
Attacker’s knowledge: by relying on the terminology in [8], we focus on a
Perfect Knowledge (PK) scenario, in which the attacker has a complete knowl-
edge about the classifier. This corresponds to consider the most favourable case
for the attacker.
Attacker’s capability: We focus on exploratory attacks [18], that is, at-
tacks carried out at test time. The large majority of the counter-forensic meth-
ods proposed in the literature belong to this category.
In the above scenario, the attacker aims at inducing a missed detection error,
by minimizing the distortion introduced into the image. It is worth stressing
that, a targeted PK attack is always successful in causing a misclassification,
i.e., it always enter the H0 region. However, it is expected that attacking a more
secure classifier will require a larger distortion.
Regarding the attack algorithm, we considered the gradient-based attack
against SVM detectors described in [11]. The attack works by computing an
approximation of the gradient of the SVM output with respect to the image
pixels. The approximated gradient provides an approximation of the steepest
descent direction of the decision function. Then, the step size (strength of the
attack) is adjusted by controlling the percentage of modified pixels. If the image
cannot be successfully attacked by modifying a maximum prescribed fraction
of pixels, the modification is applied and the process is iterated. As opposed
to other approaches, the attack proposed in [11] is directly carried out in the
pixel domain and then it can be applied even when the relationship between
the feature and the pixel domain is not invertible, as it is the case with the
SPAM features considered in this paper. The implementation of the attack
passes through the definition of a safety margin ρ [11], which determines how
much the attack goes inside the acceptance region. By choosing a larger ρ (so
to move the attacked image more deeply inside the H0 region), the attack is
more robust to perturbations of the decision boundary. This advantage goes at
the price of a larger distortion introduced in the image
In order to compare the security of the 1.5C classifier with respect to the
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2C one, we run the targeted attack in [11] against 2CH0/1 and 1C
cmb
H0
. The
performance of the classifiers under attacks are assessed on a subset of images
in StT , processed with median filtering, resizing and CL-AHE and then attacked
by means of the attack described above.
5 Experimental Results
The camera-native (uncompressed) images used for our experiments were taken
from the RAISE-8K dataset [13]. Specifically, a total amount of 7997 images
were used, split as follows (see Fig. 6): 1000 images were selected to build the
validation set SV , 5000 for the training set STr, and the remaining 1997 for
ST . Then, the images in ST were further split to build the validation, training
and test sets used for the combination classifier as follows: 300 images were
used to build SvT , 700 for StrT and the remaining 997 images to build StT . Note
that a much lower number of images would be sufficient for testing the final
SVM which is trained on just 3-dimensional input feature vectors. The images
from every set were then processed to build the class of H1 samples, whereas
the unprocessed images were used to build the class of pristine images (H0).
For security assessment, the attack in [11] was applied to 100 images in the set
StT belonging to the H1 class. To speed up the feature extraction step and the
attacks, we sub-sampled the images from the RAISE8K dataset down to a size
of 1072× 770 without interpolation.
The Matlab environment was used to process the images and to design the
classifiers of the 1.5C system. All SVMs were trained and tested by using the
LibSVM library package [10]. We run our experiments on a system hardware
Intel(R) Core i7-6700 CPU @ 3.40 GHz with four cores, and 32 GB of RAM.
5.1 Hyper-parameters Setting
As anticipated in Section 3.2, the SPAM features are extracted from the V
channel, obtained by converting the image from the RGB to the HSV color
space.
Regarding the weights assigned to the two types of error probabilities during
the validations phase, we set α = 0.2 (β = 0.8) for 1CH0 and 1CH1 and α = 0.1
(β = 0.9) for 1CcmbH0 . In making this choice of α and β, we verified that the
system robustness is not affected too much by the use of heavily asymmetric
weights. For validating the internal parameters of 2CH0/1 , we followed the stan-
dard exhaustive search method (known as grid-search) in the LibSVM library
[10], which considers exponentially growing values for C and γ to identify the
best parameters [17]. Specifically, we considered the following grid-search area:
C ∈ {2−5, 2−3, ..., 215} and γ ∈ {2−15, 2−13, ..., 23} and performed a 5-fold cross
validation (i.e. ν = 5).
To set the hyper-parameters of 1CH0 , 1CH1 , and 1C
cmb
H0
, we followed a sim-
ilar strategy by taking ν, γ ∈ {2−10, 2−9, ..., 29, 210}. In addition, since the
distribution of the samples used for internal parameter validation is very im-
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Table 1: Hyper-parameters of the SVMs classifiers.
2CH0/1 1CH0 1CH1 1C
cmb
H0
Resizing
C∗ = 211 ν∗ = 2−3 ν∗ = 2−9 ν∗ = 2−10
γ∗ = 2−1 γ∗ = 29 γ∗ = 27 γ∗ = 2−10
Median filter
C∗ = 211 ν∗ = 2−5 ν∗ = 2−9 ν∗ = 2−10
γ∗ = 2−1 γ∗ = 27 γ∗ = 26 γ∗ = 2−10
CL-AHE
C∗ = 211 ν∗ = 2−3 ν∗ = 2−10 ν∗ = 2−10
γ∗ = 2−1 γ∗ = 29 γ∗ = 27 γ∗ = 2−10
portant to learn correctly the hyper-parameters of the 1-C SVMs, we used the
entire training set to train the SVMs during the exhaustive search; then, the
validation set was used only to perform testing in this phase and choose the pair
(γ, ν) providing the best accuracy. To limit the computational burden, v-fold
cross validation was not performed in this case.
Table 1 shows the best hyper-parameters (C∗, γ∗) for 2CH0/1 and (ν
∗,γ∗)
for the three 1C SVMs. From the tables, we see that, for the 1CcmbH0 SVM, the
minimum values for the ν and γ parameters are selected, meaning that the SVM
is able to get a low probability of erroneous classification of the training samples
by relying on very few support vectors, hence minimizing the risk of overfitting.
5.2 Performance in the Absence of Attacks
The values of the decision functions of the four SVM classifiers over the test set
are reported in Fig. 7 for the case of resizing detection. We see that 2CH0/1 is
able to tell apart pristine and manipulated images, obtaining perfect classifica-
tion in the absence of attacks; moreover, the scatter plot shows that the clouds
of points are very well separated. The two intermediate 1C SVMs also achieve
high-accuracy, but the classification is not perfect. Finally, 1CcmbH0 achieves al-
most perfect classification, similarly to 2CH0/1 . For both 2CH0/1 and 1C
cmb
H0
,
the decision threshold is set to 0. Note that while for 2CH0/1 , 1CH0 and 1C
cmb
H0
,
the label y = 1 is assigned to the images of the pristine class (H0), for 1CH1 ,
y = 1 is assigned to the manipulated class (H1), and that is why the scatter
plots in Fig. 7(c) are reverted.
Very similar results were obtained for median filtering and CL-AHE. Table 2
shows the AUC values of the ROC curve for 2CH0/1 and the 1.5C classifiers, as
well as those of the intermediate 1C SVMs, for each detection task. We observe
that by using 1CcmbH0 , instead of 2CH0/1 , the performance drops very slightly in
all the cases.
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(a) 2CH0/1
(b) 1CH0
(c) 1CH1
(d) 1CcmbH0
Figure 7: Decision values of the four SVMs trained for resizing detection on the
test set, for both H0 (pristine samples) and H1 (manipulated samples). Decision
values of 2CH0/1 for the images in ST (a); decision values of the intermediate
1C classifiers (1CH0 ,and 1CH1) for the images in ST (b)-(c); decision values of
1CcmbH0 for the images in S
t
T (d).
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Table 2: AUC values of all the classifiers for the three manipulation detection
tasks. The performance of the 1.5C system are those reported for 1CcmbH0 .
2CH0/1 1CH0 1CH1 1C
cmb
H0
Resizing 1 0.96 0.96 0.99
Median Filter 1 0.99 0.99 0.99
CL-AHE 1 0.95 0.97 0.99
Table 3: Robustness of the classifiers in the presence of JPEG compression
(accuracy).
QF 2CH0/1 1CH0 1CH1 1C
cmb
H0
85 0.90 0.71 0.83 0.88
90 0.94 0.75 0.87 0.93
95 0.98 0.82 0.90 0.97
98 0.99 0.87 0.91 0.99
5.2.1 Robustness of the Classifiers
To assess the robustness of the 1.5C architecture compared to the 2C and the
1C detectors, we evaluated the performance of 2CH0/1 , 1CH0 , 1CH1 and 1C
cmb
H0
in the presence of Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance σ2 = 5 · 10−6,
10−5, 1.5 · 10−5 and 2 · 10−5 (standard deviation ranging from σ = 0.0022 to
σ = 0.0045), and in the presence of JPEG compression with Quality Factors
(QF) 85, 90, 95, and 98. For the case of noise addition, the average Mean Square
Error (MSE) introduced by the noise ranges from 0.3 to 1.
Tables 3 and 4 show the average accuracy of the tests on noisy images and
JPEG compressed images respectively, for the resizing detection task. We see
that while the performance of the 1Cs classifiers are significantly impaired by the
post-processing, the 1.5C classifier is more robust and its performance remain
comparable to those of the 2C detector.
Expectedly, if we consider a much larger noise (or a stronger compression),
the performance of the classifiers drop. In order to design a classifier that works
properly under these conditions, a possibility is to consider an aware classifier,
which takes into account the possible presence of post-processing during the
training phase, by including post-processed samples in the training set [1, 2].
This analysis is outside the scope of this paper, since here we are interested in
validating the 1.5C architecture, so we leave it for a future work.
5.3 Performance under Attacks
In this section, we assess the performance of 2CH0/1 and the 1.5C classifiers in
the presence of attacks [11]. In all the experiments, the safety margin ρ for the
attack is set to 0.
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Table 4: Robustness of the classifiers under noise addition (accuracy).
Noise parameter 2CH0/1 1CH0 1CH1 1C
cmb
H0
5 · 10−6 0.87 0.78 0.84 0.93
10−5 0.84 0.79 0.85 0.92
1.5 · 10−5 0.79 0.80 0.87 0.89
2 · 10−5 0.74 0.82 0.89 0.83
Table 5: Percentage of misclassified attacked images. The attack is carried out
against 2CH0/1 .
2CH0/1 1CH0 1CH1 1C
cmb
H0
Resizing 100% 1% %8 0%
Median Filter 100% 4% 3% 0%
CL-AHE 100% 20% 12% 0%
5.3.1 Attack against 2CH0/1
For each detection task, we first run the attack against 2CH0/1 . As expected,
the attack is always successful in inducing an incorrect classification and 100%
of the manipulated images are classified as pristine images after the attack.
Moreover, all the images can be attacked in just one iteration of the algorithm
in [11]. Fig. 8(a) shows the results for the case of resizing detection. Since we
set ρ = 0, the attack stops as soon as the decision boundary is crossed.
The values of the decision function for the other SVMs of the 1.5C c classifier
are shown in Fig. 8 (from 8(b) to 8(d))2. From Fig. 8(d), we see that attacking
2CH0/1 is not enough to fool the 1.5C classifier: the attacked samples in fact
remain much below the decision threshold and the attack success rate is 0%.
The success rate of all the attacks is reported in Table 5, where the percentage
of misclassified attacked samples for the four SVMs is provided for the three
detection tasks.
5.3.2 Attack against the 1.5C classifier
Figs. 9 shows what happens when the attack is carried out against the 1.5C
classifier. In this case, most of the times, the attack requires more than one
iteration to enter the H0 region. The Fig. refers to the case of resizing detection,
however, similar results are obtained for the other manipulations. We observe
that the values of the decision function for 2CH0/1 on the attacked samples lie
above the 0 threshold, and then the attack against the 1.5C is also effective
against 2CH0/1 . Moreover, we see that the attack is not much effective against
2Note that, while for 2CH0/1 , 1CH0 and 1C
cmb
H0
the attack is successful when it brings
the pristine samples above the threshold, for 1CH1 , the goal of the attacker is to move the
samples below the threshold.
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(a) 2CH0/1
(b) 1CH0
(c) 1CH1
(d) 1CcmbH0
Figure 8: Decision values of the four SVMs on the 100 images in StT in the
presence of the attack in [11] under H1, for the resizing detection task. The
attack is carried out against the 2CH0/1 . Decision values of 2CH0/1 (a); decision
values of the intermediate 1C classifiers (1CH0 , and 1CH1) (b)-(c); decision
values of 1CcmbH0 (d).
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Table 6: Percentage of misclassified attacked images. The attack is carried out
against 1CcmbH0 .
2CH0/1 1CH0 1CH1 1C
cmb
H0
Resizing 100% 1% 9% 100%
Median Filter 100% 20% 21% 100%
CL-AHE 100% 23% 14% 100%
Table 7: Average MSE.
Resize Median Filter CL-AHE
Attack against 2CH0/1 0.10 0.22 0.27
Attack against 1CcmbH0 0.17 0.60 0.43
1CH0 , and quite ineffective against 1CH1 , thus confirming that, thanks to the
adoption of a closed acceptance region, the 1C classifiers are more difficult to
attack. Accordingly, the attack is successful in inducing a wrong classification
for the 1.5C, mainly because 2CH0/1 fails to a strong extent. This suggests that,
in order to be successful against the 1.5C detector, the attack has to introduce
a larger distortion into the image.
The attack success rate against the four SVMs is reported in Table 6, for all
the detection tasks. Table 7 compares the attack against 2CH0/1 and the 1.5C
detector in terms of MSE. Specifically, the MSE averaged on the 100 attacked
images in StT is reported in the table for the two attacks. We see that, in
order to make the 1.5C classifier fail, the attacker must introduce a larger MSE
with respect to the case in which the targeted classifier is 2CH0/1 : the average
value of the MSE in the case of the attack against the 1.5C detector is more
than twice that necessary for the case of resizing and contrast enhancement and
almost double for the case of median filtering. The average percentage of pixels
modified by the two attacks are reported in Table 8. The table confirms that,
in order to be successful against the 1.5C classifier, the attacker has to modify
a larger number of pixels.
Table 8: Average percentage of pixels modified by the attack.
Resize Median Filter CL-AHE
Attack against 2CH0/1 9.5% 15.1% 12.3%
Attack against 1CcmbH0 13.4% 25.1% 15.1%
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(a) 2CH0/1
(b) 1CH0
(c) 1CH1
(d) 1CcmbH0
Figure 9: Decision values of the four SVMs on the 100 images in StT in the pres-
ence of the attack in [11] under H1, for the resizing detection task. The attack
is carried out against the 1.5C classifier. Decision values of 2CH0/1 (a); deci-
sion values of the intermediate 1C classifiers (1CH0 ,and 1CH1) (b)-(c); decision
values of 1CcmbH0 (d).
23
5.3 Performance under Attacks 5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
5.3.3 Comparison with 2C classifier based on Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNNs)
In order to assess the performance of the proposed system with respect to state
of the art CNN-based image manipulation detection, in this section, we consider
the case of CNN-based 2C classification in the presence of a targeted attack.
For these experiments, we considered the CNN architecture in [6], used in
the literature for several manipulation detection tasks. We set the input patch
size to 128×128. The datasets for training and testing the models were obtained
by splitting into blocks the images in STr and SV for training (and validation)
and ST for testing. The same parameters setting used in [6] has been adopted
for training the models (optimization solver, learning rate, batch size, etc . . . ).
All the models were trained on 20 epochs. The average test accuracy of the
trained CNN models are 97.8%, 81% and 86.9% for resizing, median filtering
and CL-AHE respectively.3 Given a test image, the decision is made by dividing
the image into patches (non-overlapping patches are considered for simplicity),
testing each patch with the trained model, and then fusing the CNN outputs.
For simplicity, the normalized sum of the decision scores (’0’ for original, ’1’ for
manipulated) is considered as the final score for the entire image. Then, for
a given an image, the decision is made by thresholding the accumulated score.
The performance of the classification are measured again by relying on the ROC
curve obtained by varying the decision threshold: in particular we got AUC=1
for resizing, AUC =0.98 for median filtering and AUC =0.93 for CL-AHE.
To attack the CNN classifiers, we considered the well known Jacobian-based
Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) method [25], due to its good effectiveness even
in the presence of integer rounding. To keep the distortion low, the attack is
applied with the following setting: the relative amount of pixel modification (θ)
is set to 0.005; the maximum number of times the same pixel can be modified is
set to 3; finally, the maximum number of iterations for the attack is set to 8000.
We verified that similar performance are obtained by using the pixel-domain
attack in [33] which extends the attack in [11] developed for the SVMs, to the
case of CNNs. As before, the attack is applied to 100 of images from the test set
StT , belonging to the H1 class. In order to be successful, the attack should be
able to fool the CNN model, and then revert the decision, for at least half of the
patches of the image. To minimize the overall distortion, the ’most favorable’
patches are considered by the attack, that is, those patches that can be attacked
by introducing the minimum (MSE) distortion.
The final average MSE of the attack, averaged on all the 100 images, was:
0.055 for resizing, 0.094 for median filtering and 0.347 for CL-AHE. We observe
that these MSE values are lower than those obtained with the 2C SVM for
the case of resize and median filtering detection, and always lower (significantly
lower) than those for the 1.5C case (see Table 7). This is not surprising, since it
3The detection median filtering with a small (3 × 3) window, as well as the detection of
CL-AHE are not easy tasks. Deeper networks could give better performance in this cases (see
for instance [3]); however, this goes in general at the price of lower robustness against attacks,
as deeper models are known to be more vulnerable to attacks than shallow ones [31].
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is known that CNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and can be attacked
by introducing very small perturbations. Assessing the security gain that can
be obtained by using CNNs to build a 1.5C classifier is an interesting piece of
work, and will be considered as a future research.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed to use a multiple classifier architecture, referred
to as 1.5C classifier, to mitigate the damage made by an attacker with perfect
knowledge acting against an image manipulation detector. In such a situation,
the only possible defence for the analyst is to use a detector which is intrinsi-
cally more difficult to attack. This is the case of 1C classifiers, which, however,
have the drawback of achieving inferior performance with respect to more con-
ventional 2C classifiers. By properly combining one 2C classifier and three 1C
classifiers, the adopted 1.5C classifier couples the advantages of 2C and 1C solu-
tions, achieving a superior security while retaining the good performance of 2C
classification in the absence of attacks. We implemented a particular instantia-
tion of the proposed architecture by relying on four SVMs, and we trained it so
to detect three kinds of image manipulations, namely median filtering, resizing
and adaptive histogram equalization. The experimental analysis we carried out
confirms that the 1.5C architecture is harder to attack than a 2C classifier with
similar performance.
As possible directions for future works, we indicate the development of 1.5C
solutions based on building blocks other than SVMs, for instance Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNN) detectors or a mixture of CNNs and SVMs. The ben-
efits achievable by training the 1.5C classifier with post-processed images so
to improve its robustness against post-processing operators like noise addition,
dithering or JPEG compression are also worth being investigated. Eventually,
it would be interesting to train an adversary-aware 1.5C classifier, by including
in the training phase some examples of attacked images.
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